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ABSTRACT 
The Community Documentation Centre on Industrial Risk CCDCIR) with 
this publication continues the review of the national appraoches to 
emergency planning Csee also the CDCIR publication on Nlessons learnt 
from emergencies after accidents in the United Kingdom involving dan-
gerous substancesH, CDCIR ref. N°:625-UKb3-I.3, EUR 13322 EN Cl990)). 
This publication is based on a study performed by the Rheinisch-West-
falischer TUV on HOff-site response to accidents in the Federal 
Republic of Germany#. An overview of the emergency response organiza-
tion in the FRG based mainly on presentations during Conferences on 
Emergency Planning for Industrial Hazards and on Communicating with 
the Public about Major Accident Hazards, organized by the CEC in 
Varese in l9b7 and 19H9, respectively, has also been included. 

Preface 
The Community Documentation Centre on Industrial Risk CCDCIR) with 
this publication continues the review of the national approaches to 
emergency planning Csee also the CDCIR publication on fflessons learnt 
from emergencies after accidents in the United Kingdom involving dan-
gerous substancesH, CDCIR ref. No: 625-UKb3-I.3, EUR 13322 EN Cl990)). 
This publication is based on a study performed by the Rheinisch-West-
falischer TUV on HOff-site response to accidents in the Federal 
Republic of GermanyN. An overview of the emergency response organiza-
tion in the FRG based mainly on presentations during Conferences on 
Emergency Planning for Industrial Hazards and on Communicating with 
the Public about Major Accident Hazards, organized by the CEC in 
Varese in 19ti7 and 1989, respectively, has also been included. 
Similar studies have already been initiated (france) or are planned 
for other Member Countries and are going to be performed by various 
local contractors. 
With reference to the TUV study a copy of a blanc data collection form 
has been added. Only point 7 (description of acci-
dent/emergency/disaster) and point 10 (conclusions drawn) for the 12 
accidents reviewed have been included in this publication. 
The general conclusions drawn reinforce the need for: 
a) a systematic collection of response reports, lest valuable informa-
tion and experience might not get lost; 
b) a structured dissemination of experience gained and lessons learnt 
from handling emergencies to all interested parties. 
July 1991 G. Drogaris 
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PART 1 
OVERVIEW OF THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION FOR ACCIDENTS 
INVOLVING DANGEROUS CHEMICALS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
G. Drogaris 
Institute for Systems Engineering and Informatics 
Commission of the European Communities 
Joint Research Centre - Ispra Site 
21020 Ispra CVa) - Italy 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The study of off-site response to accidents in the FRG, performed by 
the Rheinisch-Westfalischer TUV, shows that no single detailed de-
scription of the emergency response organization in the FRG is pos-
sible; each state Cland) has its own legislation for this issue Csee 
e.g. 121 1). However, there are general guidelines at the federal 
government level, setting minimum requirements and defining the 
philosophy of the emergency response organization 11 I. 
For a complete presentation of the study of off-site response to acci-
dents in the FRG it was felt necessary to present an overview of the 
emergency response organization in this country. This review is mainly 
based on presentations during a Seminar on Emergency Planning for 
Industrial Hazards 1251 and Conferences on Emergency Planning for 
Industrial Hazards 121 and on Communicating with the Public about Ma-
jor Accident Hazards 131, organized by the CEC in Varese in 1987 and 
1989, respectively, as well as during OECD Workshops. Consequently, 
the situation up to the middle of 1990 is reflected in the following. 
The prevailing safety concept for handling dangerous substances in the 
FRG based on article 2 of the German Constitutional Law CGrund Gesetz) 
requires that such installations should not create according to the 
available knowledge any risk to the public 14,161. The residual risk 
due to lack of knowledge has to be borne by the community as a general 
social weight Csozialadaquate Lasten) 1161. Consequently, whenever 
dangerous substances are employed, their substitution by innocuous or 
at least less harmful ones 11,51 is demanded. If this is impossjble, a 
hazard analysis has to be performed according to the requirements of 
the Regulation of Major Industrial Accidents CAllgemeine Verwaltungs-
vorschrift zur Storfallverordnung -Regulation applying the SEVESO-
Directive in the FRG). Based on this analysis a comprehensive, inte-
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grated three-stage safety concept has to be developed which consists 
of Ill: 
Stage 1: measures in the installation which assure the safe eontain-
ment of dangerous substances and the prevention of inadmis-
sible operating conditions; 
Stage 2: measures designed to limit the effects of fire, explosion or 
release of chemicals which might occur as the result of a 
major accident; 
Stage 3: measures taken off-site to protect the surroundings and 
limit the effects of harmful substances, heat radiation or 
consequences of an explosion on the objects to be protected. 
The first two stages are the basic requirements for on-site emergency 
planning; the third one for off-site emergency planning. Density of 
installations handling hazardous substances in the FRG as shown in 
Figure 1 underlines the importance of off-site emergency planning for 
a substantial part of this country. 
A brief presentation of available aids for on-site emergency planning 
and the evolution under the influence of the SEVESO-Directive of the 
general guidance for off-site emergency planning and for risk communi-
cation to the public will be briefly presented. A few considerations 
will be included on the important aspects of interphase between on-
iste and off-site emergency plans and of exercises and auditing of 
emergency plans. 
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2. ON-SITE SAFETY PRECAUTIONS 
On-site safety precautions have to be designed to prevent majpr acci-
dents to occur or, if they do occur, to mitigate their consequences. 
Basic requirements for safety precautions are included in 11 I: 
state regulations, e.g. the Commercial Activity Act CGewerbeordnung) 
and the regulations issued under it, the Federal Emission Control 
Act and its Regulation, the Chemical Act, the Dangerous Machinery 
Act, etc.; 
-guidelines made by the employer's liability insurance associations 
Caccident prevention stipulations); 
-trade associations Ce.g. DIN, Vdt, VDI, VDE) guidelines; 
- internal company regulations and guidelines. 
Major chemical companies had Hazard Protection Plans Con-site emer-
gency plans) drawn up even before application of the Regulation on Ma-
jor Industrial Accidents 161. According to the requirements of this 
regulation, new Hazard Protention Plans that have to be drawn up or 
existing ones that have to be adjusted, must cover all potential on-
site hazards Ce.g. fire, explosion, accident) and off-site hazards 
(e.g. malfunctions in neighbouring plants, collisions) must name on-
site safety facilities and must specify special behavioural measures 
for the plant staff in the event of an emergency 16,151. 
Hazard minimization by proper design, instrumentation and control 
systems, maintenance and training of the personnel are the principal 
requirements of the Regulation of Major Industrial Accidents 115,161. 
However, plans have also to be made for mitigation of the consequences 
of accidents especially if the potential of a public hazard (hazard 
for the life or the health of persons outside the establishment or 
material, social or environmental damage outside the establishment) 
exists. 
The Hazard Protection Plan should normally have a dual function: 
a) enable senior staff of the plant to react promptly in the event of 
an emergency; 
b) be used for plant staff training and drills. 
Ideally, the Hazard Protection Plan should be drawn up by the person 
responsible for the plant in cooperation with the Fire Protection and 
Occupational Safety departments and must be updated whenever· neces-
sary. A typical Hazard Protection Plan consists of two parts 161: an 
organizational section Cgiving a list of actions describing the be-
haviour to be adopted in the event of emergencies) and an informa-
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tional one Cgiving an overview of the plant - process description, 
block flow diagrams, building plans -, the associated hazards 
hazardous substances, hazardous areas, sources of hazards - and the 
safety equipment and systems). Big complexes may have various Hazard 
Protection Plans for various installations in the same site; then an 
overall Hazard Protection Plan of the works is required for coordinat-
ing notification/alarming process and decisions/actions affecting 
several managerial areas. 
It is recognized by the industry that properly drawing up plans en-
hances plant safety 161. 
Plant operators are also involved in emergency planning since the 
plant committees CBetriebsrate) should endorse the on-site emergency 
and alarm plans 11~1. 
Furthermore, the safety reports shall be made available on request and 
accident notification shall be communicated without any delay to them 
11 ~; I • 
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3. OFF-SITE SAFETY PRECAUTIONS 
Location of the industry and keeping of separation zones bet~een in-
dustrial and residential areas are essential steps for off-site safety 
11,71. Further emergency plans specifying alarm paths and behaviour 
instructions have to be developed 11 I. The importance of careful on-
site and off-site emergency plans and a clear definition of responsi-
bilities in the case of emergency is underlined in the general guide-
lines. 
Originally, emergency response and contingency plans were based on 
lessons learnt from previous events, which were mainly natural dis-
asters Cfloods, large fires, avalanches, earthquakes, etc.) 181. These 
plans were mainly aiming to provide aid for combating disasters, res-
cue and care of the population and selection and training of suitable 
rescue personnel. The same process has been also initially followed 
for industrial accidents, i.e. updating emergency plans according to 
aftermath of serious accidents. Specific disaster management planning 
was first undertaken to cover radiation hazards with the introduction 
of nuclear power. Major accidents in the chemical industry, in con-
junction with the fact that process industry is rather developed in 
the high population density FRG, led the Federal Office for the Envi-
ronment in Berlin in 1981 to have a study performed by the Rheinisch-
Westfalischer TUV. Interviews of plants, authorities and competent as-
sociations and literature review were used to evaluate 18,171: 
- structure and content of disaster response plans; 
-characterisation of hazard potential; 
- cooperation between plant operators and authorities; 
- organisations involved, equipment and aids available; 
- section strategies (situation evaluation, public alerting, traffic 
control, evacuation, assistance); 
- instructions and decision-making aids to emergency planners and 
disaster services;. 
The legal framework for off-site emergency planning and response is 
based on 18,201: 
a) the Disaster Response Act CKatastrophenschutz-Gesetz) and the asso-
ciated regulation on a federal and state (Lander) level; 
b) the Federal Anti-Pollution Act; 
c) the Incidents Ordinance Cl2th Bim SchV) and the Regulations·on Ma-
jor Industrial Accidents. 
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This legal framework offers a substantial prerequisite for an effec-
tive emergency planning; however, the development of specific emer-
gency plans is highly influenced by the persons involved in it_and the 
local peculiarities (especially organisational level and availability 
of equipment). Using the general principles of emergency planning, 
specific emergency plans have to be developed taking into account the 
characteristics of the hazard sources, the vulnerability of the 
objects to be protected, the population density and distribution, 
traffic routes and infrastructure, orographic and prevailing meteoro-
logical conditions. Specific emergency plans can be developed based on 
the dynamic prinicple Conly general preplanning relying on a high 
flexibility and the capacity of decision making of the emergency mana-
gement centres) or on a very detailed preplanning or any variation in 
between these two extremes 1171. 
Guidelines for a uniform emergency planning were also developed in 
this study. Efficient specific emergency plans must be 1171: 
a) simple and clear; 
b) unambiguous; 
c) complete Cnot necessarily foreseeing all details but keeping the 
balance between giving adequate information on all potential 
implications and leaving adequate flexibility for facing unforeseen 
developments). 
Emergency plans shall be drawn 117,191: 
a) considering the organisational level, the alerting and intervention 
capabilities, availability of equipment and rescue/intervention 
personnel; 
b) trying to achieve a good 
manufacturers Cexchange 
assistance); 
c) analysing the hazards 
consequences; 
cooperation between 
of information, 
of accidents and 
authorities and 
alerting, mutual 
their potential 
d) establishing necessary intervention means and actions Calerting of 
intervention teams, estimation and verification of consequences, 
risk communication to the public, alternative plans for traffic, 
public protection, medical treatment, evacuation, etc.). 
In general, emergency plans should be applicale for accidents i~ fixed 
installations and transportation of dangerous substances 1171. 
Emergency plans must adequately cover all phases of an accident 
development such as 1201: 
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a) the quick identification of the endangered area; 
b) warning of public and closure of the endangered area; 
c) verification of the extent of consequences of the accident; -
d) care for injured persons; 
e) evacuation Cif necessary- see also point 4 below); 
f) decontamination/cleaning of the affected area. 
Disaster Response Acts contain also examples of contents of emergency 
plans 1211. 
In some states Clander) such as, for example, in Baden-WUrttemberg, 
the industry bears at least partially the cost of equipment and works 
necessary for implementation of emergency plans 1191. 
4. EXAMPLE OF SPECIFIC OFF-SITE EMERGENCY PLANT CStorfallverordnung) 
On this basis local Fire Brigade, Rescue Services and Civil Defence 
drew up emergency plans for each administrative district 161. As an 
example, the specimen plan that has been introduced by the President 
of the Cologne regional administration as a guideline for drawing up 
Emergency Plans for this administrative district is briefly described 
hereafter 161: 
The Emergency Plans are kept by the competent distric disaster preven-
tion authority Ce.g. Town Clerk, District Clerk) and contain informa-
tion required for implementing measures to protect the public in the 
event of a catastrophe. Emergency Plans are only intended for use in 
conjunction with the general disaster protection plan of the authori-
ties and the alarm plan of the operator. The Emergency Plans are up-
dated annually by the district disaster prevention authority. 
The Emergency Plan is compiled in the form of checklists and consists 
of five sections: 
1) Description of the object. 
2) Reporting and alarm-raising paths. 
3) Immediate actions in the event of an emergency: 
3.1 establishing the type of hazard 
3.2 establishing the endangered area 
3.3 measuring the gas concentration 
3.4 warning and informing the public. 
4) Follow-up actions. 
5) Appendices. 
These items cover the essential elements of what is known as the 
Leverkusen Model. Nearly 25% of the total German production of chemi-
cal substances is located in the industrial region of Cologne 
19,13,201. Preventive evacuation of large areas has to be carefully 
studied and planned because of the difficulties in implementation 
(requirements in transportation means and personnel, settling down of 
evacuated, etc.) 18,91. 
The DIN data sheets COIN 52900- given in Attachment 1) that have to 
be filled in by the manufacturers have been very helpful for the 
authorities in evaluating dangers caused by substances and prepara-
tions as well as in the choice of preventive measures. 
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5. MAJOR ACCIDENT NOTIFICATION 
Manufacturers are obliged to alert the authorities in the case of 
major accidents by the Law of Fire Protection, the Law on Contingency 
Planning and the Regulation on Major Accidents 191. There are also 
regulations at state level defining accident notification oblications 
and the content of the notification Csee e.g. 1221 for North Rhenania 
Westphalia). Installations falling under the SEVESO-Directive require 
a uniform incident notification system by means of the standard form 
shown in Attachment 2. In part D of this form, manufacturers are 
required to classify the abnormal event. According to this 
classification, actions are to be taken and various groups Csee 
Attachment 3 for the definition of these groups) are to be alerted as 
follows 19,201: 
Step 1: Signifies an internal irregularity, for example a minor re-
lease of toxic gas, a small fire or a failure in the control 
system which causes an abnormal situation. 
Action: The firefighting forces, the police and the local authorities 
are alarmed. No alert is given to the public and no measures 
are to be taken off-site. 
Step 2: Signifies an internal danger with the possibility of a threat 
to the internal staff, but not for the public or the environ-
ment. Examples are a runaway reaction, overheating of a pres-
sure vessel or a small release of toxic substances. 
Action: Besides the fire brigades and the police on duty, the heads of 
their regional offices are informed and go into a stand-by po-
sition (silent alarm). In the case of disturbing signals from 
the site, e.g. a fume column, smell, noise from explosions, 
but no real danger occurs, the public would be informed. 
Step 3: Is announced if the danger spreads off-site. An impact of the 
public or the environment is likely. Examples are the release 
of a toxic cloud which leaves the limits of the installation, 
or a major fire which spreads toxic fumes throughout the 
neighbourhood. 
Action: Additional alarm groups Cgroups III-V, referring to Attach-
ment 3) are informed and go into a stand-by position. The 
Emergency Operation Centre CEQC) and the Technical Field Head-
quarters CTFH), which are uniformly organized under the German 
Law on Contingency Planning, are activated to a stand-by posi-
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tion. Some public emergency forces take action in response to 
the accident. The common public is informed by radio; the 
public which is directly endangered is instructed by r?dio and 
patrol cars with loudspeakers. 
Step 4: Is the catastrophic level. The 
trolled by the on-site forces; 
the public or the environment. 
accident is no longer con-
there is a severe danger for 
Action: The accident is classified as a disaster. The EOC and TFH is 
fully operable and takes over the guidance of all response 
forces. All groups, including group VI and VII if necessary, 
are alarmed. The informing of the public takes place with 
standardized radio messages in a broad manner. Directly 
affected people are also instructed through patrol cars with 
loudspeakers. 
If appropriate, an evacuation is preplanned for each particular site. 
The decision to evacuate or not is supported by a decision flowsheet 
19,10 I. 
The system has run in the centres of the chemical industry in the FRG 
for over ten years. It works sufficiently well. The main problem in 
the start-off phase was the organization of reliable information chan-
nels between the operator and the fire brigades. In the industrial re-
gion of Cologne there are uniform treaties between the Cologne Fire 
Department and all hazardous installations of the Seveso-type. Within 
these treaties, the above-mentioned notification system is fixed and 
direct telephone lines to the central fireguard are switched on 191. 
Combination of serens, radio and patrol cars with loudspeakers is used 
to inform and alert the public 1201. Serens neither do identify the 
source of hazard nor the area affected and create an extensive wave of 
telephone calls to police and firebrigade which can block telephone 
lines. On the other hand, serens are very useful during night for 
waking up the public, who then should look for more precise 
instructions through the radio. Patrol cars with loudspeakers are 
effective both for waking up and giving precise instructions to the 
public. 
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6. RISK COMMUNICATION TO THE PUBLIC 
An effective implementation of emergency plans requires that the 
public that might be affected in the case of a major accident is in-
formed on the nature of the danger and the proper behaviour according 
to the requirements of article 8 of the SEVESO-Directive Cas has been 
modified after the 2nd amendment of this Directive). Especially in the 
FRG after the catastrophic accidents in Bhopal, Tschernobyl and 
Sandoz, there is an increased pressure from the public for getting 
more information on the various major accident hazards and the 
emergency plans 1241. 
In the FRG the public is supposed to be informed already before 
licensing for operation is granted to an installation. According to 
the Federal Immission Control Act the manufacturer is obliged to 
present to the local authorities a number of documents Csee 
Attachment 4) Ill I. The application is made known to the public by the 
local authorities through announcement in its official journal and in 
daily newspapers. Any citizen has the right to review all the 
documents required for the application for licensing except those 
concerning business or trade secrets. 
If judicial remedies are exhausted it may take years until a final de-
cision on an application is taken. Hence, the operators deplore this 
fact as a barrier to investment Ill I. The authorities receive on the 
average every three to five years notification due to modifications of 
installations or processing materials; consequently, the latest 
information on the actual hazard potential is made available to the 
public every three to five years. 
Modification of the regulations implementing the SEVESO-Directive in 
the FRG in order to include the requirements of risk communication to 
the public, as has been set out in article 8 of the Directive after 
its second amendment, was planned for 1990. Some manufacturers ex-
pressed reservations considering that communication to the public of 
potential dangers from installations could be taken as contradictory 
to the requirement of the Federal Immission Control Act according to 
which licensing is granted to an installation provided that it creates 
no danger to the public 1121. 
Before 1990, local authorities within the framework of off-site emer-
gency response preparedness distributed to the public leaflets with 
12 
instructions for the proper behaviour in the case of an emergency. An 
example of such a leaflet and the accompanying letter, both translated 
in English, is given as Attachment 5 Ill I. A copy of the ~riginal 
leaflet, distributed in the area of the city of Cologne, is also given 
as Attachment 6. The states (Lander) would prefer that the manu-
facturers themselves fulfil the obligation to inform the public on po-
tential dangers in consultation with the responsible authorities Ill I. 
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7. EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISES AND AUDITING 1131 
Should an emergency escalate to step 3 or 4 Csee paragraph 5)_ and the 
units of the Disaster Prevention Service must be alerted or brought 
in, an Emergency Operation Centre is created eEOC or Katastrophen-
schutzleitung - KSL). This operation staff group consists of officers 
of the professional fire brigade together with the directors of 
various city offices such as the Health Office or the Press Office. It 
also includes members of state agencies such as the police and mili-
tary services and Cif necessary) members of private companies. Depend-
ing on the situation at the site of the emergency, one or several 
Technical Field Headquarters CTFH or Technische Einsatzleitung -TEL) 
are established. They consist of an officer of the professional fire 
brigade together with a small operation staff and they direct the 
units that have been put under their command. 
In order to assess the effectiveness of emergency plans, every city 
has to perform exercises mostly in cooperation with the industry, 
which also covers partially the cost of such exercises 1191; in the 
state CLand) of North-Rhine-Westphalia they must carry out a disaster 
prevention exercise at least twice a year. These exercises must be di-
rected to specific local risk factors, should enable a realistic simu-
lation of a disaster and also the testing of disaster prevention mea-
sures. They should include the following procedures: 
1) notification of the management and units of the Disaster Prevention 
Service and other agencies; 
2) communication between the EOCs, the subordinate TFHs, the super-
visory authority and other state agencies and Cif necessary) pri-
vate companies; 
3) situation assessment and decision making by the operation staff; 
4) the execution of measures such as warning, evacuating and assisting 
large numbers of injured people. 
Three types of exercise can be performed depending on the specific 
aim: 
- alarm exercise; 
- staff exercise; 
- complete exercise. 
Any combination of these exercise types is also possible. The alarm 
exercise is intended for verifying the time interval between alarming 
and the -ready for action· state. A staff exercise is only performed 
by the operation staff while the units at the disaster scene are simu-
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lated. During a complete exercise the EOCs, TFHs and all units perform 
the exercise in a simulated emergency situation. 
Staff exercises are most frequently performed. Alarm exercises for the 
4500 assistants of the Disaster Prevention Service in Cologne only 
take place once every 3 years. Complete exercises are only performed 
approximately once every 5 years due to the extensive preparations 
necessary. 
The main conclusions of the exercises carried out that are also sup-
ported by the experience gained from accidents 1141 are: 
- The notification of leading staff memebers and units of the Disaster 
Prevention Service must be done by sirens or by using a collect call 
for radio receivers; alarm by telephone requires too much time and 
is less effective. 
- Plans must also be made for employing units with only 5~~ of their 
personnel. 
- Radio communications networks are often overloaded or even jammed 
during the early stages of an emergency. They are also frequently 
used by reporters. Mobile telephones or use of private telephone 
lines with secret telephone numbers so that they cannot be blocked 
by calls from the public are necessary for EOCs and TFHs. 
-Since TFHs are overloaded, especially during the early stages of an 
emergency, it may take 45 minutes or more before EOC receives a 
first detailed report. Therefore, EOC should have their own scouts 
that can report from the scene of the emergency. Direct video camera 
transmission, even from a helicopter, into the control centre has 
proven to be very efficient. 
- Management groups can only work efficiently if they are kept as 
small as possible. The positions and tasks within the group must be 
defined beforehand to allow for proper preparation and practicing. 
Every position must be occupied by two persons to enable shift work 
during longer duration emergencies. 
- Good cooperation within management groups and between management 
groups and private chemical companies is essential. Exchange of 
staff members with members of the factory management as liaison of-
ficers has proven to be very effective. 
-Chemical companies are very cooperative in exercises simulating 
transport accidents inside or in the direct vicinity of the factory 
area, but reluctant to simulate an accident in a production or 
storage area. 
- Special attention has to be 
boundary between neighbouring 
paid to factories located on the 
cities since, in addition, coordina-
15 
tion and cooperation of the management groups is required. Single 
planning and protection responsibility of the city where the larger 
potential is located is the preferred alternative. Tasks, Jnforma-
tion exchange and responsibilities must be defined precisely in ad-
vance. 
- Use of loudspeaker-equipped vehicles for alerting the public has ex-
tensively been tested in the Cologne area and the results have been 
used as a basis for planning. Eighty-four fire brigade vehicles, 
which are either permanently occupied or which can be employed imme-
diately, were equipped with loudspeakers, cassette tape decks and 
prerecorded cassette tapes. However, the success of a combined alarm 
using sirens, radio broadcoast and loudspeaker vehicles is not known 
as this combination has not yet been tested. Such an exercise would 
require a large amount of participation from the general public. 
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8. CONCLUSION 
-
Emergency planning in the FRG is based on the experience gained from 
accidents. Regular exercises and close cooperation with chemical com-
panies are used to improve the emergency response preparedness, espe-
cially in centres with a high concentration of industrial activities. 
In rural areas, however, emergency plans may be still inadequate and 
disaster control teams may be ill-equipped and inadequately trained 
11 I . 
There are several problems of legal and technical nature which can be 
observed in practice regarding emergency plans 11 I and more work is 
required to provide frank and comprehensive information to the public 
on potential dangers 11,11,121. 
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Fig. 1: Density of installations covered by the requirements of the 
SEVESU-Directive C82/50l/EEC) in the FRG in 1987. 
Sources 19,231. 
ATTACHMENT 1 
Date: 
DIN safety data sheet 
Division: 
Commercial product name: -
1.1 Chemical charactenzation: 
1.2 Form: 1.3 Colour: 1.4 Odour: 
2. Physical data and safety data Tested 1n accordance w1th 
2.1 Change in physical state 
oc 
oc 
3 
2.2 Dens1ty ( OC) g/cm3 
Bulk density kg/m 
2.3 Vapour pressure ( oq mbar 
( oq mbar 
2.4 ViSC(')Sity ( OC) 
2.5 Solubility 1n water ( oq g/1 
in · ( oq g/1 
2.6 pH value (at g/1 H20) ( OC) 
2.7 Flash point oc 
2.8 lgn1tion temperature oc 
2.9 Explos1on limits Lower: Upper: 
2.10 Thermal decomposition 
2.11 Hazardous decomposition products 
2.12 Hazardous reactions 
2.13 Further information 
3. Transport GGVSee/IMDG code: UN No.: ICAO/IATA-DGR: 
GGVE/GGVS: RID/ADR: ADNR: 
Other information: 
4. Regulations 
-. 
-
. 
I 
~-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. 
j Commercial product name 
5. Protective measures, storage and handling 
5.1 Technical protective measures 
5.2 Personal protective 
equtpment 
5.3 Industrial hygtene 
Respiratory protection: 
Hand Protect1on. 
5 4 Protect1on against fire and explosion 
5.5 Otsposal 
Eye protection: 
Other: 
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------~ 1 6. Measures in case of accidents and fires 
6.1 After spillage/leakage/gas leakage 
6.2 Ext1nguish1ng media Su1table· 
Not to be used: 
6.3 First a1d 
6.4 Further Information 
7. Information on toxicity 
8. Information on ecological effects 
9. Further information 
DIN 52900 - Tre data g1ven here are based on current knowledge and expenence 
The purpose of th1s Safety Data Sheet IS to descnbe the products 1n terms of the1r sate:y requ1rements 
The data do not s1g .. ily any warranty 11.1th regard to the products' propert1es 
ATTACHMENT 2 CSource 1~,101) 
PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION UF A MAJOk ACCIUENT 
Installation: 
Substance: 
Amount: 
Wind: 
- direction: 
- speed: 
A Classification 
1. On-site 
2. Off-site 
C Effect off-site 
1. Smell molestation 
1.1 not excluded 
1.2 expected 
1.3 no longer expected 
Date: 
Time: 
Office of reception: 
Message received at: 
8 Character 
1. leakage 
2. runaway reaction 
3. fire 
4. explosion 
2. Uanger for life and health through gas clouds 
2.1 not excluded 
2.2 expected 
2.j not expected 
j, Uanger of an explosion 
3.1 not excluded 
J.2 expected 
3.3 not expected 
3.4 no longer expected 
U Notification - expected reactions 
1. Preliminary notification- no reactions necessary 
2. Notification - reactions not expected 
3. Notification - reactions necessary 
4. Notification- full reactions necessary 
ATTACHMENT 3 CSource 19,101) 
Different groups to be alarmed in a major accident 
PROFESSIONAL GROUPS 
Group I 
- authorities 
-public services 
- private fire brigades 
uroup I I 
- rescue forces 
- medical services 
- water/electricity supply 
VOLUNTEER GROUPS 
Group II I 
- transport enterprises 
-civil engineering enterprises 
etc. 
Group VI 
- scientists 
- engineers 
- experts 
Group VII 
- information services 
SPECIAL GROUPS 
Group IV 
- operator of hazardous 
installations 
Group V 
- persons or facilities which 
need special protection 
ATTACHMENT 4 
Documents which shall be presented and published 
(extract from the Fourth Ordinance Implementing 
the Federal Immission Control Act) Source Ill I. 
Art.4 Type and amount of documents 
Cl) The application shall be supplemented by documents which are 
required in order to examine the prerequisites to the licencing 
procedure. 
C2) The documents shall contain information on 
1. engineering facilities which are necessary for the operation 
of the installation as well as auxiliary facilities which-
due to operational requirements -have to be established and 
operated in the vicinity, 
2. the planned process including necessary data on the 
identification of the process as well as information of the 
kind and amount of 
- substances used, 
- intermediate products, by-products and fi na 1 products, 
-waste substances produced, 
3. perceivable secondary reactions and by-products caused by 
problems in the course of the process, 
4. type and extent of emissions which will probably be caused by 
the installation; type, position and size of emission sources; 
distribution of emissions over space and time; as well as 
conditions at the outlets, 
5. planned measures on the protection against harmful effects on 
the environment, especially measures for the reduction of 
emissions as well as measurements on emissions and immissions, 
6. planned measures for the protection of the general public and 
immediate neighbours against other dangers, considerable 
disadventages and considerable nuisance, 
7. planned measures in order to ~se residual substances or to 
dispose waste, 
~- planned measures in the field of occupational safety and 
health. 
C2a) Installations which are subject to the Hazardous Incident 
Ordinance and which are listed in Annex I to the Hazardous 
Incident Ordinance shall require a safety analysis which meets 
the requirements of Article 7 of the Hazardous Incident 
Ordinance. Sentence 1 shall not apply if the licencing authority 
promises the applicant in writing that the applicant shall be 
partially or totally discharged from his obligations pursuant to 
Articles 7 and 9 of the Hazardous Incident Ordinance in 
accordance with the licence granted pursuant to Article 10 of the 
Hazardous Incident Ordinance. 
C3) In addition to the documents presented in accordance with 
paragraph 1 the applicant shall present a clear and short 
description of the layout of the installation and perceivable 
effects on the general public and the neighbourhood. He shall 
also present a list of the documents included in the application 
which marks those documents that include business or trade 
secrets. 
EMERGENCY 
Emergency 
Dear Citizens, 
ATTACHMENT 5 
Information to the Public CSource Ill I) 
You are living in a city with chemical industry which means that you 
have to be prepared for incidents in your immediate neighbourhood. In 
such a case you have to bear in mind certain rules of behaviour and 
certain measurs to protect yourself. Please keep this leaflet for an 
emergency in an easily accessible spot. 
The Lord Mayor 
EMERGENCY 
EMERGENCY 
EMERGENCY 
EMERGENCY 
EMERGENCY 
EMERGENCY 
If you hear about an incident in a chemical plant or about an accident 
with chemical products in your neighbourhood which has an effect on 
the environment, please, bear in mind the following rules. You will 
thus help to improve your personal protection and assistance provided 
for the entire community. 
siren 
loudspeakers 
neighbours 
windows 
When you hear the siren Chowling sound for 1 minute) 
turn on your radio CSUdwestfunk I, II or III, or ARD 
late-night programme). 
Listen to the announcements made by the fire brigade 
or the police. 
Inform your immediae neighbours. 
Close windows and doors. 
air-conditioning Shut off your air-conditioning and ventilation 
systems. 
rooms 
outside 
doctor 
If possible stay in rooms at the upper floors which 
are not adjacent to outside walls. 
Do not stay outside. 
In case of health problems contact your family 
doctor or doctors on emergency duty. 
site of accident Do not approach the site of the accident and keep 
streets and roads free for fire brigades, police, 
etc. 
police 
telephone 
~all cleard 
Follow the instructions given by the police. 
Do not block telephone lines to the fire brigade, 
the police and rescue services asking for 
information. Call only if your special situation 
Cfire, accident) necessitates their help. 
Listen to the ·all clear· announcements made over 
the radio or by the fire brigade or the police. 
Published by the office for public relations of the city of 
Ludwigshafen. 
) 
ATTACHMENT 6 
DIE STADT KOLN INFORMIERT 
Verhalten bei 
Wichtige lnformationen fUr lhre Sicherheit-
biffe aufmerksam lesen und aufbewahren 
. -
..... 
------------------f:~-1}1-~f·c:rr:~~f{f.io~il~e-·n·- f · 
. . . .... '. . .. ' l 
~Wiew.erilenSieiUnterrichtef; ? • 
Bei Katastrophen, grof3eren Unglucksfallen und Terroranschlagen 
werden Sie durch geeignete MaBnahmen alarmiert, wie z. B. 
~ Bekanntmachungen in Rundfunk und Fernsehen 
.... durch die im Stadtgebiet installierten Sirenen 
..... durch Lautsprecherdurchsagen der Feuerwehr oder Polizei 
Wesentlich fUr aile Burger ist es, die Bedeutung der verschiedenen 
Sirenensignale zu kennen! 
Sir,enens~gnale1im1f.rjeCieni~ 
1 Minute Heulton 
Rundfunkgerat einschalten -
auf Durchsagen achten 
...... 2 x unterbrochener Dauerlon von einer Minute 
..... 2 x unterbrochener Dauerlon von einer Minute, 
nach 12 Sek. Dauerton von einer Minute 
Feueralarm 
K~~trophenalarm 
Nlenn$ie:Selbst:eiriScha·aenser.eignismelden,1nennen:Sie-! 
..... Ort des Ereignisses 
(StreBe, Hausnummer, Stadtteil) 
..... Ereignis 
(welche Personen oder Sachen sind betroffen, 
AusmaB, Ursachen) 
..... lhren Nomen 
\Wichftge11'elifonnummemiin~oln:o~ 
Feuerwehrruf 
Rettungsdienste 
Notarzt 
Rettungshubschrauber 
Polizei-Notruf 
112 
112 
112 
112 oder 24 24 24 
110 
Stadtverwaltung (Information) 221-1 
Hausarzt ........................................................ . 
Krankenhaus ................................................. . 
Apotheke ...................................................... . 
) 
) 
r;1 't. m;, m 1 am tm' o, q em o tt11 
~ Bleiben Sie zu Hause oder am Arbeitsplatz, und achten Sie 
auf Lautsprecherdurchsagen von Feuerwehr und Polizei und Rund-
funkdurchsagen. 
~ Kinder sofort in's Haus rufen! Donn sind sie unter Aufsicht 
und konnen nicht durch Unwissenheit falsch reagieren . 
.... Helfen Sie alteren oder behinderten Nachbarn 
und StraBenpassanten! 
.... Venneiden Sie, daB die Einsatzkrafte bei Branden und UngiUcks-
fallen durch Schaulustige behindert werden! 
Polizei, Feuerwehr und Hilfsorganisationen sind auf freie Straf3en 
angewiesen. Wenn Sie nicht selbst helfen konnen, bleiben Sie 
dem Schadensort fern, und blockieren Sie keine Verkehrswege! 
... Telefonleitungen nicht blockieren! 
Feuerwehr, Polizei und betroffene Untemehmen benotigen jede 
Telefonleitung zum Einleiten von Hilfs- und Rettungsmaf3nahmen; 
deshalb dort nur im Notfall anrufen! 
.... Auch wenn Sie nicht unmiHelbar betroffen sind, konnen Sie 
durch lhr besonnenes Verhalten wirkungsvoll zu einer 
schnelleren Gefahrenabwehr und Schadensbeseitigung beitragen! 
t :1? {.' ,ft m *&Ztt tm aw m e:. m m 
QfifC1ttl'·'6. IF tl I u t. [ •l! tft3 if§ I i1 fJI ltt I fffl ttl 
..... Den besten Schutz finden Sie in einem geschlossenen Gebaude! 
Fenster und Turen schlief3en, Klimaanlagen abschalten! 
So konnen Gase ausgeschlossen bleiben und nicht ungehindert 
in die Wohnung gelangen. 
~ Obere Stockwerke aufsuchen! 
Viele Gase sind schwerer als Luft. 
Deshalb sind hoher gelegene Raume im allgemeinen sicherer! 
~ Nasse Ti.icher bereitfegen! 
Vor Mund und Nose gehalten, konnen Sie Beeintrachtigungen 
der Atmung vermindem! 
... Lautsprecherdurchsagen beachten! 
Feuerwehr und Polizei informieren Sie i.iber erforderliche 
Verhaltensregeln durch Lautsprecherwagen! 
...... Radio einschalten! 
Meldungen uber den Storfall, Verhaltensregeln und Entwamung 
werden, soweit notwendig, ouch i.iber die regionalen Sender 
bekanntgegeben! 
·. 
:~:.~~'-
~·-",.., ... 
-... -.,;. 
~~~;~t 
}~.-~:· 
- '. 
PART 2 

Project Manager: 
Compiled by: 
- 1.0-
Study of off-site Response 
to Accidents in the Federal 
Republic of Gemany 
Ordered by the European Atomic 
Energy Community (Euratom) 
Contract no. 3~79-88-10 ED ISP D 
GUnther MUller 
Alan Miles 
Erika Moch 
GUnther MUller 
Rheinisch-WestHHischer Technischer Uberwachungs-Verein e.V. 
D - 4300 Essen 1 
Vice President and Chief Technical Officer Dr.-lng. Siegfried Wiesner 
October 1990 
- 1.1 -
Contents 
1 Final Report 
1.1 Introduction 
- 1. 3 -
1.2 Statutory Bodies involved 
- 1. 5 -
1.3 Sources of Information 
- 1. 6 -
1.4 Explanation of Form 
- 1. 8 -
1.5 General Comments on Cases -1.11-
1.6 Final Conclusions 
-1.13-
1.7 Recommendations for further Procedure - 1.14-
* 2 Cases 
2. 1 Case No 700409 - 2. 1.1 -
2.2 Case No 790206 - 2. 2.1 -
2. 3 Case No 791001 - 2. 3.1 -
2.4 Case No 800508 - 2. 4.1 -
2.5 Case No 820908 -2.5.1-
2.6 Case No 830125 - 2. 6.1 -
2. 7 Case No 830215 - 2. 7.1 -
2. 8 Case No 830803 - 2. 8.1 -
2.9 Case No 850118 - 2. 9.1 -
2.10 Case No 860626 - 2.10.1 -
-2.11 Case No 861223 - 2.11.1 -
2.12 Case No 890518 -2.12.1-
*Note: Only pages 7 <descriptions of accident/emergency/disaster) and 
10 <conclusions drawn) are herewith presented. 
- 1.2 -
3 Appendices 
3.1 Appendix 1: Keys - 3. 1 -
3.2 Appendix 2: Registers - 3. 6 -
3.2.1 Chronology - 3. 6 -
3.2.2 Places of events, alphabetical - 3. 7 -
3.2.3 Substances involved - 3. 8 -
3.2.3.1 alphabetical - 3. 8 -
3.2.3.2 UN No - 3.10-
3.2.3.3 CAS No - 3.11 -
3.2.3.4 Total formula - 3.12 -
4 References - 4. 1 -
5 Sample Data Collection form 
-5.1-
- 1.3 -
1.1 Introduction 
The Council Directive of the European Communities of 24 June 1982 on the major-
accident hazards of certain industrial activities (82/501/EEC) also known under the 
designation "Seveso-Directive" obliges the states of the European Community to ta-
ke precautions 
- to prevent major accidents 
- to cope with large-scale emergencies 
- to provide the means for limiting the consequences of major accidents and finally 
- to mitigate an impact on the public. 
This obligation is expressed in article 7, No I with the words: 
The Member States shall set up or appoint the competent authority or authorities 
who, account being taken of the responsibility of the manufacturer, are responsible 
for: 
- ensuring that an emergency plan is drawn up for action outside the establishment 
in respect of whose industrial activity notification has been given. 
- ... to provide the means for limiting the consequences thereof. 
The establishment of an emergency plan demands a wide range of 
laws, regulations and instructions 
- clear organizational frameworks to build up a functioning management system 
and to link up all response groups in a suitable way 
- knowledge of appropriate equipment and means 
- various experts in the fields of: 
- organization 
- fire-fighting 
- rescue operations 
- medical care 
- communication systems 
-chemistry 
- police matters 
and so on. 
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An indispensible tool however, when emergency response plans are to be establis-
hed, is experience gained with former accidents. Up to now a variety of publications 
have appeared on the subject of major accidents [1, 2, 3, 4]. These normally present 
the facts of what happened in a lucid and brief way. But there is throughout a gap in 
the details given of the countermeasures. It is precisely these, however, which are 
decisive points of interest when setting up an emergency response plan as well as 
when a major accident has occurred. The above mentioned tool can be characterized 
by the term: 
"exchange of experience". 
There is a real need to list and classify those measures and countermeasures which 
had to be taken by the authorities and the response groups to cope with specific ha-
zardous situations. 
With this in mind, initially 12 cases which occured in the FRG are to be looked at as 
a first step to closing the gap of information which is urgently needed by organizers 
of response planning as well as by responders. Living without risks is simply not 
possible, but good and comprehensive information can suppon responders in their 
decision-making in the field of disaster relief an in mitigating and limiting the con-
sequences of hazards. 
This study is intended to fill the g::-~p and to promote the exchange of experience par-
ticularly with respect to questions such as: 
-which dangerous substances have caused a major accident I hazardous situation? 
-which types of impact have arisen off-site? 
-in which way was emergency I accident response prepared? 
-what types of organizations have been assigned? 
- how many men where assigned ? 
-what was the personal protective clothing? 
-which vehicles, means, equipment, agents were applied? 
- what was the time sequence for the assignment of the response groups ? 
-how was the public informed '1 
-what lessons can be learned by the specific case? 
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1.2 Statutory Bodies involved 
To perfonn this study it was necessary to contact a large number of authorities re-
sponsible for questions of disaster response or directly involved in response measu-
res. To achieve acceptance and to avoid problems with local authorities we staned 
by making contact with high-level statutory bodies such as: 
- Federal Agency for Civil Defence 
- State Ministries of the Interior 
- District Governments 
- Gennan Association of Fire Brigades. 
While working on the different cases we built up personal contacts with the respecti-
ve statutory bodies at the place of the event. These were: 
- Major Disaster Protection Authorities 
- Police Headquaners 
- Municipal Fire Brigades 
- Voluntary Fire Brigades (outside larger towns) 
- Work Fire Brigades. 
The latter are also statutory bodies. This is based on the acts of the different states in 
the FRG governing fire brigades, fire protection, disaster response and special servi-
ces [5]. Under these acts work fire brigades are entitled to perform their tasks with 
the powers of authorities. 
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1.3 Sources of Information 
Information on major accidents or imminent danger situations which <l!e of interest 
for this study was gathered from different sources as listed below. In an initial over-
view we studied publications such as: 
- newspapers 
national newspapers e.g 
Die Welt 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
Handelsblatt 
Si.iddeutsche Zeitung 
regional newspapers according ro places where accidents or serious situations oc-
curred and to those editions which reported on the relevant facts 
- manuals 
the useful manuals include: 
C.H. Yervalin[4] 
Fire Protection Manual for Hydrocarbon Precessing Plants 
UBA [1] 
Major Accidents Manual 
UBA [3] 
Documentation on Disturbances in Industrial Plants or involving dangerous 
Substances 
Due for publication in the near funure 
- specialistjournals 
the most informative and therefore most used journals are: 
Bevolkerungssch u tz- Magazi n 
Brandhilfe 
brandschutz I Deutsche Feuerwehr-Zeitung 
Brandschutz in Rheinland-Pfalz 
Fire International 
Gefahrliche Ladung 
- 1.7 -
112 Magazin fi.ir den Feuerwehr-Mann 
Schweizerische Feuerwehr-Zeitung 
VFDB, Zeitschrift fi.ir Forschung und Technik im Brandschutz 
Zivilschutz-Magazin 
Zivilverteidigung 
- reports 
reports dealing with special major accidents, for example in a particular case 
the Report of the BASF Work Fire Brigade or reports dealing with different cases 
such as Report of Hazardous Incident Commission, FRG 19.09.1984. 
To study reports, articles and I or brochures only available for examination in ar-
chieves we had to contact some institutions at different places. These include: 
- Bundesamt fi.ir Zivilschutz 
Federal Agency for Civil Defence 
- Kathastrophenschutzschule des Bundes 
Federal Disaster Control Academy 
- Landesfeuerwehrschule 
Fire Brigade Academy 
- Schweizerischer Feuerwehrverband 
Swiss Fire Brigades Association. 
The most imponant and essential sources of information, however, have been the 
personal contacts with those bodies engaged in the response measures. With these 
contacts we gathered verbal infonnation as well as insights into assignment reports. 
In some cases we inspected the place of the event and obtained vivid descriptions by 
the officer in charge of the case in question. The bodies we contacted w.ere some of 
those listed in chapter 2: Statutory Bodies involved. In the forms these types of in-
formation are marked: P.I. = personal infonnation, point 11, page 13. 
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1.4 Explanation of Form 
The forms used to describe the off-site response measures are designed to ensure a 
concise, clear and comprehensive survey of all those facts significant for the respon-
se measures. The information given on the forms is intended to feed a database. The 
facts are divided into eleven catagories. 
Catagory 1 identifies the case to date by the letter D, indicating a German case, and 
a number which is made up of the date in reverse order. Later, when the study is 
continued, the letter D will be replaced by CH for Switzerland or A for Austria. 
Catagory 2 includes the date and place of the event, the time of the alarm, the type 
of activity during which the accident happened and up to three of the hazardous sub-
stances involved in the event, ei!her because they were present before the event or 
they were produced in the course of the event. 
The substances are characterized as follows: 
- chemical name or names in English 
- chemical formula 
- chemical abstract service registry number 
- identification number, preceded by UN No 
- hazard class number, Kemler-number 
the first figure indicates the main danger e.g.: 
2 gases 
3 flammable and combustible liquids 
4 flammable solids 
5 oxidizers 
6 poisons 
8 corrosive agents 
the second and third figures indicate additional dangers. If there is an X before 
the figures there is a danger 1n combination with water 
- hazchem code 
the hazchem code gives infonnation under the following headings: 
-fire fighting number: 
1 =jets 
2=fog 
3 =foam 
4 =dry agent 
- personal protection 
P, R, W, X= full protection 
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S, [ii,T, O.Y.D. z.ta =closed-circuit breathing apparatus 
- evacuation 
E = consider evacuation 
- action to be taken 
P, R, S, T demand for dilution 
W, X, Y, Z demand for containment of released substance or substance plus 
extinguishing water 
- violent reaction 
possible violent reaction is indicated by letter V. 
The type of the accident I disaster under review is signified by one or more of the 
tenns in the last box of catagory 2. Imminent danger means in this case: quasi dan-
ger, imagined risk. In this case there is no real danger to the public. 
Catagory 3 lists the potential hazards of the substance, the situation, the sequence of 
events, but not the real danger which actually occurred. 
Catagory 4 and 5 list the impacts off- and on-site which actually occurred. 
Catagory 6 illustrates the accident preparedness based on the requirements of the 
Hazardous Incident Ordinance, Storfall-Yerordnung, and I or on the statutory cont-
ingency planning and the precautions of the fire-brigades. 
Catagory 7 describes in concise form some facts of the accident which have to be 
known to understand the description of the countenneasures. 
Catagory 8, catagory 9 and catagory 10 present the most important infonnation with 
respect to the characterisation of this study. 
Catagory 8 specifies in detail the assigned personnel, bodies, vehicles, equipment, 
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means an agents and gives a rough overview of the countermeasures. 
Category 9 deals with the care for the public, especially with respect to information. 
Category 10 points out what the case, the actions and the result of all responses 
show. In relation to the remark that every chemical accident can be used to improve 
the precautions, as mentioned in chapter 1, this category grants the most effective in-
formation. 
Category 11 finally lists the sources of information for those users of this study who 
require additional knowledge of the case under review. 
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1.5 General Comments on Cases 
The study contains 12 cases selected with a view to covering a wide range of critical 
situations, preferably those caused by hazardous substances. 
Major criteria in the selection were: 
- the range of occurences should represent: 
release 
fire 
explosion 
environmental pollution 
imminent danger 
- unexpected or very new occurences 
- examplary precautions 
- new methods of attack 
- response measures which are of special interest, and which have been characteri-
sed by extreme expenditure of personnel, equipment, means 
- assignment of special operational units (e.g. task force, TUIS). 
In particular the cases are typified as follows: 
release case no 
explosion and fire cases no 
major fire cases no 
700409 
790206 
830215 
860626 
790206 
791001 
820908 
890518 
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new method of attack case no 
examplary precaution case no 
epidemic danger case no 
environmental pollution cases no 
assignment of special units case no 
puncture of a presurized gas-tanker case no 
imminent danger case no 
861223 
850118 
830803 
791001 
830803 
830125 
800508 
830125. 
The cases are described in a way which makes it possibele to collect data simply on 
the assigned men, vehicles, equipment, the countermeasures, the activities perfor-
med, point 8, and point 9 Care for the Public. Particularly attention is drawn to the 
comparison between advance contingency preparedness and the countermeasures ta-
ken in the event, point 10, Conclusions drawn. Finally in each case it is worked out 
what lessons can be learned from this event. This is in accordance with the basic 
principle of this study: to offer a reality-based support for all endeavours in establis-
hing emergency response plans, in improving the preplanned countermeasures and I 
or in finding the appropriate and correct decisions when the event has occurred, and 
do this by the exchange of experience. 
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1.6 Final Conclusions 
As we know from experience, responders often need many hours to cope with what 
happened or went wrong in the first 20 minutes. To improve the effects of the first 
responders within the first few minutes after the alarm has been given, it is essential 
that their decisions and assignments be based on experience gained with hazardous 
situations in the past, either by themselves or especially by others. This study should 
be regarded as a first step in providing the responding groups with comprehensive 
information on: 
how an appropriate emergency preparedness can be established 
- which vehicles, equipment and agents have to be kept ready for specific assign-
ments 
- how the logistical problems were managed at the scene 
- how many personnel were needed to cope with specific situations 
- what has to be done in special situations under similar conditions. 
In preplanning activities the knowledge gained from earlier response measures will 
help ensure that the off-site emergency plans and the on-site plans are mutually 
compatibel. 
Initial operations in case of an emergency are determined essentially by the time fac-
tor. A collection of response descriptions published in a suitable context will help 
minimize and mitigate the consequences of any major accident I hazardous situation. 
It will enable the responders to save time by taking correct decisions after being 
alerted. 
While preparing this study we encountered an increasing acceptance on the part of 
the bodies we contacted. This was based on the recognition that the results of any 
endeavours may help to improve precautions and assignment activities. According 
to the principle that every major hazard I hazardous situation can help to improve 
the countermeasures, we made excellent contacts for our work. In view of this we 
can state that this study, seen as a feasibility study, has confirmed the expectation 
that the large scale collection of response reports can be successfully conducted. 
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1.7 Recommendations for further Procedure 
As we progressed with the study, it became clear to us that the following is impor-
tant with regard to our further endeavours: 
- this study is now under discussion by all bodies concerned with questions of re-
sponse to hazardous situations. On the one hand, this is based on our personal 
contacts, on the other on informative events e.g. conferences, discussions, review 
meetings and I or personal contacts within these bodies. 
- the bodies mentioned showed great interest in obtaining the results and in the de-
tails of the study, which is to be published as an additional tool for planning or 
improving precautions and as a basis for decision-making in an actual hazardous 
situation. 
- experts in major accident response management expect that the collection of 
countermeasure reports will be pursued without delay on a larger scale, and even 
across national frontiers. 
To achieve optimum benefit from this study and from those established in other 
countries, we recommend the following procedure: 
- the reports of countermeasures taken to date, should be published immediately. 
Publication may be in the form of loose-leaf collection. That would offer the pos-
sibility of supplemention and I or to updating the collection subsequently without 
difficulty. In addition these reports should be stored in a database. In any case, 
the reports should be made available to all those bodies concerned with response 
measures. 
- the Joint Research Centre should promote the presenting of papers on this sub-
ject. The aim has to be to arose interest in this information system on a broad ba-
sis, to create acceptance at different levels of the bodies concerned and to promo-
te assistance for further endeavours in this field. 
- the study and the establishment of countermeasure reports in relation to actual 
events should be extended to the five new states of the FRG. Moreover they 
should cover our neighbouring countries Switzerland and Austria. 
In the course of the study we have made exellent contacts in Germany. We are in a 
position to commence similar activities without delay in particular in Switzerland 
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and Austria, and also in the United States. We could start with corresponding activi-
ties immediately. To maintain our contacts, activities aimed at extending the collec-' 
tion of cases should be initiated at the earliest opportunity. 
~I 
w I 
-2.1.7- D -700409 
7. Description of accident I emergency 1 disaster 
Impact on the public 
Source of danger: 
Weather conditions: 
yes 0 no D unobt. 0 
by mistake the connection hose of a tank car carrying chlorohydric 
acid was connected to a tank containing sodium hydroxide solution 
wind of west 
Short description of development of accident: 
hydrochlorid acid reacted with sodium hydroxide SQ.tution to form 
chlorine gas which was released 
Time sequence for decisions of actions taken: 
9.14 alarm 
9.16 employment of fire brigade 
10.45 all clear 
I· .. 
., ~ 
.. ,. t- 0. 790206 
7 •.. Description of accidenJ! emergency c;;:;::r5ter 
Impact on the public yes 0 no 0 unobt. 0 
Source of danger: presumably short circuit 
Weather conditions: temperature -3 ·c: slight wind; overcast, fog, wind from the east 
Short description of development of accident: 
-faulty current cable caused fire 
0 
- fire caused dust explosion 
Time sequence for decisions of actions taken: 
06.02.:21.27 alarm 
21.30 assignment of 4 engine companies 
21.50 assignment of additional engine companies 
22.15 assignment of 2 fire-fighting boats, water supply by 
the pumps of the fire-fighting boats and by a high-
pressure main 
23.30 assignment of BW bulldozer tanks 
07.02.: 17.20 a rescue dog team started searchc;>perations 
12.04.: 17.00 all clear 
. 2 3 7. 0. 791001 
7. Description of accident I emergency dis:~ster 
Impact on the public yes 0 no 0 unobt. 0 
Source of danger: presumably vvelding work 
Weather conditions: cloudless. warm. slight wind from southwest 
Short description of development of accident: 
a tank farm in a port was set on fire after explosion of fuel oil tanks; 
a major conflagration followed 
Time sequence for decisions of actions taken: 
10.41 alarm 
10.45 fire brigade turned up on scene 
10.50 fire attack 
15.41 all clear 
Impact on the public yes 0 no 0 unobt. 0 
Source of danger: pressurised gas tanker 
Weather conditions: dry, cloudy, wind from north 
Short description of development of accident: 
during shunting operations in a marshalling yard two tankers contai-
.. ...:" .. 
ning vinyl chloride crashed: one tanker was punctured by a buffer: vi-
nyl chloride released and exploded Immediately after being ignited 
by an electric arc o.f the overhead line 
Time sequence for decisions of actions taken: 
1 0.34 operation control center of the fire brigade watched fire and 
smoke 
10.35 one engine company started on sight without an alarm having 
been sounded 
1 0.40 fire brigade reached scene of conflagration 
11.1 o fire brigade was informed on the nature of the hazardous 
good 
11.50 all clear 
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7. Description of accident . emergellcy <.Jis:.a::;ter 
Impact on the public yes 0 no 0 unobt. 0 
Source of danger: leak in a m~th3nol pipe-line 
Weather conditions: easterly wind. w1nd velocity 3 ... 5 rnlsec 
Short description of development of accident: 
release of methanol due to a leak in a pipe-line aRE! ignition most 
probJbly by a short circuit in a cable 
Time sequence for decisions of actions taken: 
11.28 alarm 
11.31 fire attack 
11.33 alert stage 4 
11.42 alert stage 6 
11.45 predisaster warning 
11.55 OEC arranged 
12.00 EOC manned 
13.20 fire under control 
15.54 all clear 
D-830125 
· 7. .Description of accident.' emerg.; ·.:: 'i dis.::s:ar 
···r-------------------------
Impact on the public yes D no 0 unobt. D 
Source of danger: derail\?d pressurised gas tank car 
Weather conditions: damp and cold, light rain 
Short description of development of accident: 
a pressurised gas tank car derailed in a marshalli_Qg yard during 
shunting operations; the derailment was caused by inadvertent 
operation of points 
Time sequence for decisions of actions taken: 
3.06 alarm 
16.00 evacuation 
16.40 start of salvage operations 
19.40 all clear 
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7. Description of accident 1 ernetgency ui~:..~ster 
Impact on the public yes D no 0 unobt. 0 
Source of danger: exp!os;on of a pump recipient 
Weather conditions: overc:tst. 1tgt1t wind 
Short description of development of accident: 
- pollut.on by anorganic salt has caused a thermaL-decomposition of 
anthracenedione 
- recipient exploded 
-released thermooil, diphyl, was set on fire 
Time sequence for decisions of actions taken: 
3.38 lire attack 
9 00 ~~~clear 
D- 230803 
7. Description of accident 1 emergency 1 disaster 
Impact on the public yes 0 no D unobt. D 
Source of danger: arson 
Weather conditions: bright. warm 
Short description of development of accident: 
·fire in v ... ~rehouse with cold-storage plant, 6.200 t butter, 3,000 t 
meat were stored 
- extent of fire to entire warehouse and cold storage plant 
- damage to ammonia evaporator 
- release of molten butter 
• disturbance to public 
Time sequence for decisions of actions taken: 
0.56 alarm 
1.01 assignment of 2 engine companies 
1.21 assignment of 4 additional engine companies and of 2 
fireboats 
3.03 fire-fighting operations by 9 engine companies 
11.30 fire unter control 
additional fire-fighting operations over a period of 17 days 
. 2.9.7. 0-850118 
7. Description of accident i emergency 1 disaster 
Impact on the public yes 0 no D unobt. 0 
Source of danger: explosion in the distillation unit of an ethylene plant 
Weather conditions: frost, ·6 ·c 
Short description of development of accident: 
a release of gas was followed by an explosion of the gas cloud; 
this caused a major fire 
Time sequence for decisions of actions taken: 
15.42 alarm 
15.47 fire attack 
17.10 fire under control 
17.28 all clear 
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· 7. Description of accident I emergenc;' /disaster 
Impact on the public yes 0 no D unobt. 0 
Source of danger: ignition of vapour by static charge 
Weather conditions: light north-easterly wind, 30 ·c, hot dry weather 
Short description of development of accident: . 
after loading of a tanker with benzene a sample was to be taken: due 
to incorrect behaviour of the sample-taker benzene vapour ignited 
causing an explosion and ensuing fire 
Time sequence for decisions of actions taken: 
14.35 alarm 
14.38 fire brigade on scene, fire attack 
14.44 cooling of the harbour tanks 
14.53 engagement of an firte-fighting boat 
17.09 all clear 
.i 
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7. Description of acci<.H:· ,, . ~::mergency 1 disaster 
Impact on the public 
Source of danger: 
Weather conditions: 
yes no D unobt. 0 
leaking pressure gas road tanker 
winter weather, temperature around freezing point, light easterly 
wind, snow-fall 
Short description of development of accident: 
tanker was about to fill a stationary LPG tank when the connection 
hose fractured; propane escaped forming a gas cloud covering an 
area of 500 m2 with a higth of 1 m 
Time sequence for decisions of actions taken: 
13.47 alarm 
14.06 evacuation of neighbouring houses, turning off of heating fa-
cilities. attack with diffuser spray nozzle 
15.06 measuring of propane concentration in the air in the village 
and on an open field 
19.00 all clear 
I •-,_ _;• .... 
7. Description of accident' emergency, C!S41ster 
Impact on the public 
Source of danger: 
yes D 
release of butane 
ignition of gas cloud 
no 0 
Weather conditions: cloud-free, warm, slight wind from eastsoutheast 
Short description of development of accident: 
unobt. 0 
during repair work on a pipe containing butane, butane was re-
leased and ignited, this escalated into a major fire involving diffe-
rent sorts of hydrocarbons 
Time sequence for decisions of actions taken: 
8.51 alarm 
8.56 fire attack 
9.03 call in additional operational units 
9.15 establishment of OEC 
13.00 all clear 
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10. ·Conclusions drawn 
Countermeasures taken compared with contingency preparedness: 
Need for additional preparedness yes no 
Which measures I means: D 
- stock of a sufficient number of closed-circuit breathing apparatus with full face masks 
-wind cone 
- better marking of tanks and mains for dangerous materials 
Lessons learned: 
fire brigade is to be informed very soon of the kind of dangerous substances 
10. Conclusions drawn 
Countermeasures taken compa:c:j : .. trl cont1ngency preparedness: 
- external atd had to be calle'j 1n 
- BW bulldozer tanks 
- rescue dog team 
Need for additional preparedness yes 
Which measures I means: 
- extensive actions call for a well equipped mobile command center 
Lessons learned: 
no 
D 
-in the case of a major and long-term f.re an additional water supply from high-pressure 
mains and I or fireboats are essential 
. 2 3 12. 
10. Conclusions drawn 
Countermeasures taken corr.pJro:?d : .. :n cont,ngency preparedness: 
- additional water was prov1d~?d '.':itn the J•d of fire boats 
- additional operational units ::.:re to be cJIIed 1n immediately 
Need for additional preparedness yes 
Which measures I means: D 
Lessons learned: 
for fire fighting operations in tank farms are to be kept ready: 
- sufficient foam 
- a number of oil booms 
D-791001 
no 
moreover one or more fire-fightmg boats should be to call in immediately 
D- 300508 
10. Concluslons drawn 
Countermeasures taken compared ·.vJttl contingency preparedness: 
water supply of the marshalling yard was insufficient to cope with a major fire 
Need for additional preparedness yes no 
Which measures 1 means: D 
-water supply on the marshalling yard is to be increased 
- plans of sewage systems hare to be available 
- marshalling yards should be made more accessible 
Lessons learned: 
technical assistance, e.g. by TUIS, is inevitable in the case of a critical situation with hazar-
dous materials 
. i 
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10. Conclusions drawn 
Countermeasures taken compared ·:.1th cont.r.g::ncy preparedness: 
- special disaster response p!Jn en3oled ertective employment 
- availability of a car with gJs detection equ1pment 
Need for additional preparedness yes 
Which measures 1 means: 
- coordination of warning text between f1re brigades and police 
- detailed description of the storage of dangerous goods with updating 
Lessons learned: 
D- 820908 
no 
0 
- a good cooperation between municipal fire brigade and works tire brigade was based on a 
joint drill 3 months before 
-warning texts must be coordinated between police and fire brigade 
-special gas-measure equipment for quick action is to be kept ready 
- 2 ~ 12. ~)-830125 
10. "Conclusions drawn 
Countermeasures taken compare-a :.:a ill contingency preparedness: ·. 
this event confirmed the inaispensibility of TUIS in particular situations 
Need for additional preparedness yes no 
Which measures 1 means: D 
Lessons learned: 
the provision of empty tank cars is difficult and time consuming 
1 7, 2. 0- 830215 
10. Conclusions drawn 
Countermeasures taken comp.::~red :.;tn cont1ngency preparedness: 
Need tor additional preparedness yes no 
Which measures I means: D 
hydraulic platform tor l1re figt11ing puposes in higths exceeding 30 m without need tor indoor 
tire attrack 
Lessons learned: 
i 230803 
·10. Conclusions drawn 
Countermeasures taken compared with contingency preparedness: 
- extinguishing water could not be collected 
- communication system of response groups was interferred with a foreign transmitter; 
transmission frequency had to be changed 
- capacity of animal carcass utilisation plants was not sufficient 
- water supply was supported by the pumps of two fireboats 
Need for additional preparedness yes 
Which measures I means: 
- preventive fire protection of warehouses has to be worked out with respect to 
• fire sectors, party walls, fire doors 
-·limitation of fire load 
·smoke-flue pipes, heat remov~! pipes 
- smoke detectors 
- access to warehouses from all sides tor fire engines is essential 
no 
D 
- provision of facilities to supply waterways, streams, rivers in special cases with oxygen to 
keep fish alive 
Lessons learned: 
- alarmregister must include 
- addresses of animal carcass utilisation plants up to greater distances 
- addresses for suction cars and cleaning facilities 
- possibilities for combatting rats or other health hazards 
- warehouses are to be equipped with a sufficient number of pillar hydrants and I or ground 
· hydrants 
• cleaning companies must be on standby 24 hours 
. 2 9.12. D · 850118 
10. .Conclusions drawn 
Countermeasures taken compared with contingency preparedness: 
Need for additional preparedness yes no 
Which measures 1 means: 0 
- setting up of an extinguishing water collection basin 
- improved information to the public in case of a dangerous situation 
- special letter to inform the public: new edition 
Lessons learned: 
- in case of an accident an immediate alarm from the company management should be 
given to the municipal fire brigade 
- mutual aid and technical assistance by neighbouring WFsO was necessary 
10 •. ·.Conclusions drawn 
Countermeasures taken compared with contingency preparedness: 
usuable equipment was available such as: 
• mobile monitors 
• wooden oil booms 
- plastic oil booms 
Need for additional preparedness 
Which measures 1 means: 
yes 
0. 860626 
no 
D 
- marking of inland tankers carrying dangerous goods with orange warning plates which 
display hazard class number and UN • No 
- inclusion of the harbour loading and unloading installations in the stationary protedive 
system 
Lessons learned: 
-staff ist to be trained regularly in the use of stationary fire extinguishing installations 
• fire practices supervised by the fire brigade should be performed annually 
. i 
·21112- 0. 861223 
10. Conclusions drawn 
Countermeasures taken compared with contingency preparedness: 
Need for additional preparedness yes no 
Which measures I means: D 
Lessons learned: 
expulsion of an explosive gas cloud by spray is very efficient: to avoid injuries to the firefigh-
ters full protection suits must be worn 
. 2.12.12. 
10. . Conclusions drawn 
Countermeasures taken compared with contingency preparedness: 
- sufficient water supply by a great number of pillar hydrants 
- additional water was provided with the aid of fireboats 
Need for additional preparedness yes 
Which measures 1 means: D 
Lessons learned: 
!) - 830518 
no 
fireboats were temporary on radio set of 2 m-band unattainable. This was caused by the 
hight of a steel-armed jetty-wall and by the steeltanks which reflected the radio waves 
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3.1 Appendix 1: Keys 
In the forms are used abbreviations or keys for some terms. Some of these are inter-
national usual, some are special keys in Germany. 
The abbreviations I keys are: 
A 
AL 
ASB 
B 
BF 
BLEVE 
BRK 
BW 
c 
CVE 
trailer ladder 
workers rescue service 
Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund-Deutschland e.V. 
professional fire brigade 
boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion 
Bavarian Red Cross e.V. 
Bayrisches Rotes Kreuz e. V. 
Ferderal Defence Forces 
Bundeswehr 
confined vapour explosion 
D 
DB 
DL 
DLK 
DRK 
E 
ELF 
ELW 
EOC 
F 
FF 
G 
GW 
GW-A 
German FeLkral Railway 
Deutsche Bunde~bahn 
turntable ladder 
turntable ladder with basket 
German Red Cross e. V. 
Deutsches Rotes Kreuz e.V. 
fire fighting conduct car 
mobile command center 
emergency operation center 
volunteer fire brigade 
tool and gear carrier 
breathing apparatus tender 
H 
HB 
J 
JUH 
K 
Kdow 
KTW 
L 
LB 
LF 
M 
MTW 
N 
NAW 
NZZ 
0 
OEC 
' "' - ..) . .) -
Handesblart 
Johanniter rescue service 
Johanniter-Unfall-Hilfe e. V. 
control unit 
ambulance 
turntable ladder with stage 
fire squad tender 
personnel carrier 
emergency ambulance 
Neue ZUrcher Zeitung 
on-scene emergency center 
p 
P.I. 
PLF 
p 250 
R 
RTW 
RW 
s 
s 
STF 
SW 
T 
THW 
TLF 
TroLF 
TroTLF 
TSA 
TUIS 
personal in formation 
dry powder tend~r 
dry powder traikr, 250 kg 
ambulance vehicle 
emergency tender 
foam-making nozzle 
foam agents vehicle 
hose carrier 
technical assistant service 
Bundesanstalt Technisches Hilfswerk 
pump water tender 
dry powder tender 
dry powder tank tender 
trailers for portable fire pumps 
Transport Accident Information and Assistance System 
Transport- U nfall- Informations- und Hilfeleistungs-System 
u 
UBA 
unobt. 
UVCE 
v 
VFDB 
w 
WAZ 
WF 
WLF 
WSP 
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Federal Environmental Agency 
U m weltbundes<ulH 
unobtainable 
unconfined vapour cloud explosion 
Journal for Research and Technics in Fire Protection 
Zeitschrift flir Forschung und Technik im Brandschutz 
Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung 
works fire brigade 
vehicles for fire-fighting purposes 
waterway police 
5 von 5 
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3.2 Appendix 2: Registers 
3.2.1 Chronology 
Date Case No Place 
09.04.1970 700409 D- 6750 Kaiserslautem 
06.02.1979 790206 D- 2800 Bremen 
01.10.1979 791001 D- 4100 Duisburg 
08.05.1980 800508 D- 8500 Nlirnberg 
08.09.1982 820908 D- 5000 Koln 
25.01.1983 830125 D - 4200 Oberhausen 
15.02.1983 830215 D- 2212 Brunsblittel 
03.08.1983 830803 D- 2000 Hamburg-Wilhelmsburg 
18.01.1985 850118 D - 5047 Wesseling 
26.06.1986 860626 D - 6800 Mannheim 
23.12.1986 861223 D- 6912 Dielheim-Balzfeld 
18.05.1989 890518 D- 2000 Hamburg 
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3.2.2 Places of events, alphabetical 
Place Case No 
D - 2800 Bremen 790206 
D- 2212 Brunsbtittel 830215 
D- 6912 Dielheim-Balzfeld 861223 
D- 4100 Duisburg 791001 
D - 2000 Hamburg 890518 
D - 2000 Hamburg-Wilhelmsburg 830803 
D- 6750 Kaiserslautern 700409 
D- 5000 Koln 820908 
D - 6800 Mannheim 860626 
D - 8500 Ntirnberg 800508 
D - 4200 Oberhausen 830125 
D - 5047 Wesseling 850118 
3.2.3 Substances involved 
3.2.3.1 Arranged alphabetically 
Substance Formula Case No Place 
Ammonia NH3 830803 D - 2000 Hamburg-Wilhelms burg 
Anthracenedione, 
1-nitro C14H7N04 830215 D- 2212 Brunsbtittel 
Benzene, Light 
oil, Phenylhydride C6H6 860626 D - 6800 Mannheim 
Butane C4H10 890518 D - 2000 Hamburg 
Chlorine Cl2 700409 D - 6750 Kaiserslautem 
Crude oil 890518 D- 2000 Hamburg 
Diphyl C12HloO·C12HIO 830215 D- 2212 Brunsbtittel 
Ethane C2H6 850118 D - 5047 Wesseling 
Ethylene C2H4 850118 D- 5047 Wesseling 
Flour 790206 D - 2800 Bremen 
Gasoline 890518 D - 2000 Hamburg 
Grain 790206 D - 2800 Bremen 
Heavy fuel oil 791001 D - 4100 Duisburg 
Hydrochloric acid HCI 700409 D- 6750 Kaiserslautem 
Methanol CH30H 820908 D- 5000 KOln 
Propane C3Hs 861223 D- 6912 Dielheim-Balzfeld 
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Propylene, Propene, 
Methylethene C3H6 850118 D- 5047 Wesse1ing 
830125 D - 4200 Oberhausen 
Sodium hydroxide NaOH 700409 D- 6750 Kaiserslautem 
Vinyl chloride C2H3Cl 800508 D- 8500 Niimberg 
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3.2.3.2 Arranged according UN No 
UN No Case No Place 
1005 830803 D - 2000 Hamburg-Wilhelms burg 
1011 890518 D- 2000 Hamburg 
1017 700409 D - 6700 Kaiserslautem 
1035 850118 D- 5047 Wesseling 
1077 850118 D- 5047 Wesseling 
1077 830125 D - 4200 Oberhausen 
1086 800508 D - 8500 NUrnberg 
1114 860626 D - 6800 Mannheim 
1115 890518 D - 2000 Ham burg 
1230 820908 D- 5000 Koln 
1267 890518 D- 2000 Hamburg 
1789 700409 D - 6750 Kaiserslautem 
1823 700409 D- 6750 Kaiserslautem 
1962 850118 D- 5047 Wesseling 
1978 861223 D - 6912 Dielheim-Balzfeld 
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3.2.3.3 Arranged according CAS 1'\o 
CAS No Substance Case No Place 
67- 56- 1 Methanol 820908 D- 5000 Koln 
71- 43- 2 Benzene, Light oil, 
Phenylhydride 860626 D - 6800 Mannheim 
74- 84-0 Ethane 850118 D- 5047 Wesseling 
74- 85- 1 Ethylene 850118 t> - 504 7 Wesseling 
74-98-6 Propane 861223 D- 6912 Dielheim-Balzfeld 
75-01-4 Vinyl chloride 800508 D - 8500 Niirnberg 
82- 34- 8 Anthracenedione, 
1-nitro 830215 D- 2212 Brunsbiittel 
106-97- 8 Butane 890518 D - 2000 Hamburg 
115- 07- 1 Propylene, Propene, 
Methylethene 850118 D- 5047 Wesseling 
115- 07- 1 Propylene, Propene, 
Methylethene 830125 D - 4200 Oberhausen 
1310- 73- 2 Sodium hydroxide 700409 D - 6750 Kaiserslautern 
7647-01-0 Hydrochloric acid 700409 D - 67 50 Kaiserslautern 
7664-41-7 Ammonia 830803 D - 2000 Hamburg-Wilhelmsburg 
7782- 50- 5 Chlorine 700409 D- 6750 Kaiserslautern 
8002-05-9 Crude oil 890518 D - 2000 Hamburg 
8004- 13-5 Diphyl 830215 D- 2212 Brunsbiittel 
8006-61-9 Gasoline 890518 D - 2000 Hamburg -
3.2.3A Arranged according total formula 
Formula Substance CAS No Case No 
CH30H Methanol 67- 56- 1 820908 
C2H3Cl Vinyl chloride 75- 01 - 4 800508 
C2H4 Ethylene 74- 85- 1 850118 
C2H6 Ethane 74- 84- 0 850118 
C3H6 Propylene, Propene, Methylethene 115 - 07- 1 850118 
830125 
C3Hs Propane 74-98-6 861223 
C4H10 Butane 106- 97- 8 890518 
C6H6 Benzene, Light oil, Phenylhydride 71- 43- 2 860626 
C12HloO·C12Hlo Diphyl 8004- 13- 5 830215 
C14H7N04 Anthracenedione, 1-nitro 82- 34- 8 830215 
Cl2 Chlorine 7782- 50-5 700409 
HCl Hydrochloric acid 7647- 01 - 0 700409 
NaOH Sodium hydroxide 1310-73-2 700409 
NH3 Ammonia 7664- 41 - 7 830803 
- -+. 1 -
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5. 1 
Commission of the L...::··:p~?an Commun1t1es 
JOINT ~1f 
RESEARCH 
CENTRE 
REPORT OF OFF·SITE RESPONSE MEASURES 
1. Identification 
I Case No.: 
2. General Data 
Date, time of event 
Time of alarm 
Place 
Type of activity 
- industry 
type of industry 
- transport 
- storage 
- others 
Dangerous substances Involved: 
1. Substance 
chemical name ( s) 
formula 
CAS No. 
UN No: Hazard class : 
- 1 -
D 
rail D road D others 0 
Hazchem Code: 
D 
D 
2. Substance 
chemical name (s) 
formula 
CAS No. 
UN No: 
3. Substance 
chemical name (s) 
formula 
CAS No. 
UN No: 
5.2 
Hazard class : 
Hazard class : 
Type of accident/disaster: 
CVE D UVCE 
Hazchem Code: 
Hazchem Code: 
D BLEVE 
fire D release D leakage 
other catastrophe D deflagration D 
imminent danger D 
Declaration of major disaster yesD noD 
- 2 -
D 
D 
5.3 
D-
3. Potential hazard 
forman yes D no D 
poisoning D distress D 
pressure wave D panic D 
apparent danger D restriction of traffic D 
injuries D fatal injuries D 
evacuation D irritations D 
burns D shock D 
for environment yes D no D 
air pollution D water pollution D 
soil pollution D vegetation poisoning D 
demage to buildings D . .. to traffic facilities D 
-3-
5.4 
4. Actual types of impact off-site 
for man yes D no D 
poisoning D distress D 
pressure wave D panic D 
apparent danger D restriction of traffic D 
injuries D fatal injuries D 
shock D evacuation D 
irritations burns D 
- respiratory D 
- eyes D 
- skin D 
for environment yes D no D 
air pollution D water pollution D 
soil pollution D vegetation poisoning D 
damage to buildings D . .. to traffic facilities D 
-4-
5.5 
0-
5. Actual types of impact in-site 
forman yes D no D unobt. D 
injuries D fatal injuries D 
for plant yes D no D unobt. D 
damage to buildings D 
damage to process units D 
damage to storage tanks D 
damage to traffic facilities D 
extent of damage unobt. D 
6. Accident preparedness 
yes no unobt. 
D D D 
Plant/unit submitted to Hazardous Incident Ordinance D D D 
Safety analysis established D D D 
General emergency response plan established D D D 
Special disaster response plan in force D D D 
Early warning system arranged D D D 
reserved telephone line to: D 
radio connection to: D 
fire alarm D 
-5-
,.. ____ 
6. Accident preparedness continued 
Fire brigade 
special countermeasure plan 
information on dangerous substances 
special response plan according to safety analysis 
assignment instructions 
kind of special equipment according to safety analysis 
EOC arranged 
alert schedules prepared 
float-charts for decisions established 
disaster manual available 
preliminary estimation of hazardous area (plume spread model) 
plastic overlays 
other precautions: 
Informing the public in advance: 
special letter 
special page in directory 
informational meeting 
- 6 -
-~ LJ -
yes 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
no unobt. 
D D 
D D 
D D 
D D 
D D 
D D 
D D 
D D 
D D 
D D 
D D 
D D 
• 
5.7 
7. Description of accident 1 emergency 1 disaster 
Impact on the public 
Source of danger: 
Weather conditions: 
yes 0 
Short description of development of accident: 
Time sequence .for decisions of actions taken: 
-7-
D-
no 0 unobt. 0 
J -
8. Countermeasures 
yes no unobt. 
Assignment 
Species of organizations involved 
professional fire brigade D D D 
works fire brigade D D D 
industrial fire brigade D D D 
police D D D 
civil service I defence service D D D 
voluntary organizations D D D 
medical services D D D 
FF D 
D 
D 
Fire brigade 
vehicles: quantity and type (DIN) 
men duration of assignment 
helicopter D fire-fighting boat D 
means and agents 
branch pipes: size (DIN) 
quantity 
hydro-shield: quantity 
monitors: quantity 
foam D heavy D medium D light D 
dry powder 0 0 D 
- 8-
5.9 
0-
8. Countermeasures continued 
- assessment of hazardous area: 
- detector tubes D 
- explosimeter D 
- plume spread modelling D 
- plastic overlays D 
- personal protective clothing: 
Police 
- men: - vehicles: quantity: 
- kind of activity: 
yes no 
- evacuation procedure D D 
- emergency route D D 
- inner core 1 outer ring D D 
- equipment 
Civil service I civil defence 
yes no 
- EOC manned D D 
- OEC manned D D 
- kind of activity: 
-
- . duration of assignment: 
-9-
8. Countermeasures continued 
Voluntary organizations 
- name(s): 
- kind of activity: 
Medical service(s) involved: 
Short description of countermeasures: 
Additional remarks: 
-10-
5.11 
0-
9. Care for the public 
Actions for information 
Warning to the public 
time of warning unobt. D 
warning means 
long range loudspeakers D 
sirens D 
loudspeaker cars D 
radio D 
telephone hot lines D 
others 
yes no unobt. 
Information on safe behaviour D D D 
Means of information 
loudspeaker cars D D D 
leaflets D D D 
radio D D D 
telephone hot lines D D D 
Evacuation procedure D D D 
selective evacuation D 0 D 
general evacuation D 0 D 
• approximate number of evacuees 
- 11 -
5.12 
10. Conclusions drawn 
Countermeasures taken compared with contingency preparedness: 
Need for additional preparedness 
Which measures I means: 
Lessons learned: 
-"12-
yes 
D 
J -
no 
D 
5.13 
0-
11. Source(s) of Information 
• 
• 
-13-

